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This paper analyzes long-term trends in intergenerational earnings mobility in
France. I estimate intergenerational earnings elasticities for male cohorts born be-
tween 1931 and 1975. This time period has witnessed important changes in the French
labor market and educational system, in particular a large expansion in access to
secondary and higher education as well as an important compression of earnings dif-
ferentials. Intergenerational mobility is estimated using a two-sample instrumental
variables approach. Over the period, intergenerational earnings mobility exhibits a
V-shaped pattern. Mobility falls between cohorts born in the mid 1930s and those
born in the mid 1950s, but subsequently rises. For cohorts born in the ﬁrst half of the
1970s, age-adjusted intergenerational earnings elasticity amount to around .55. This
value is signiﬁcantly higher than the elasticity estimated for the baby-boom cohorts.
It is also slightly lower than the elasticity estimated for cohorts born in the 1930s but
the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. Changes in the extent of mobility mostly
reﬂects the evolution of cross-section earnings inequality, rather than variations in
positional mobility.
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Over the last ﬁfteen years, an important body of research has investigated the extent of
the intergenerational transmission of income inequality. Two main results have emerged
from this literature. First, individual economic well-being, in developed societies, is much
more strongly inﬂuenced by family background than was thought two decades ago : on
average, between 20 and 60% of economic advantage is transmitted, within families, from
one generation to the next (Solon 1999, Black & Devereux 2010). Second, the transmission
of economic inequality varies considerably across countries and countries where inequality is
lower generally tend to exhibit higher intergenerational mobility (Björklund & Jäntti 2009).
From a theoretical perspective, the determinants of intergenerational economic mobil-
ity are now well established (Becker & Tomes 1979, Solon 2004). However, beyond the
above-mentioned stylized facts, the factors that shape intergenerational economic mobility
empirically have not been much explored. Why does the degree of intergenerational mobil-
ity vary across countries ? To what extent does it change over time ? How does the level of
economic inequality relate to the persistence of inequality across generations ? Have recent
changes in the wage structure aﬀected the degree of economic mobility ? What policy in-
tervention in general, and what features of the educational system in particular, may help
foster equality of opportunity ? Such important questions remain largely unanswered.
The objective of this paper is to analyze changes over time in the extent of intergen-
erational earnings mobility in France over the second half of the twentieth century. This
period appears particularly interesting for the study of economic mobility, since it witnessed
a considerable expansion of access to secondary and higher education, as well as an impor-
tant reduction in the degree of earnings inequality. In particular, given the large reduction
in earnings inequality that occurred throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, older cohort
were exposed to a much larger degree of inequality of family environment than the more
recent ones. In this context, looking at changes across cohorts in economic mobility may
help us improve our understanding of how the intergenerational transmission of inequality
is inﬂuenced by the overall economic and social environment.
In this paper, intergenerational mobility is measured by the now standard intergenera-
tional earnings elasticity (IGE), which can be obtained by regressing the log of individual
1earnings on the log of their father’s earnings. I estimate cohort-speciﬁc IGEs for male
cohorts born between 1931 and 1976. In the absence of linked parent-child data sets mea-
suring earnings over such a long period, I use a two-sample instrumental variables approach
(Arellano & Meghir 1992, Angrist & Krueger 1995) as ﬁrst applied to the estimation of the
IGE by Björklund & Jäntti (1997). The estimation exploits a labor force survey covering
the period 1964-2003 that contains information on both individual earnings and several
parental characteristics, including father’s education which is used to form a prediction of
father’s earnings.
As is now well understood, the estimation of the intergenerational earnings elasticity,
in particular the assessment of trends, is vulnerable to what has been referred to as the life-
cycle bias. This bias arises from the fact that current earnings measured early (resp. late) in
the life-cycle tend to underestimate (resp. overestimate) the extent of permanent earnings
inequality among fathers or sons (Jenkins 1987, Grawe 2006, Haider & Solon 2006). In this
paper, I use the speciﬁcation of Lee & Solon (2009) to provide estimates of the average and
cohort-speciﬁc IGE in France that correct for life-cycle bias.
Changes in earnings inequality may aﬀect the extent of intergenerational mobility in
various ways. For instance, a more compressed earnings structure in the father’s generation
may weaken the link between family income and child’s human capital investment. Next,
a compression of earnings diﬀerentials among children is expected, other things equal, to
mechanically decrease the IGE. To account for the changes across cohorts in the IGE, I
compare its evolution to the evolution of cross-sectional earnings inequality among sons and
among fathers. I also analyze changes over time in the intergenerational earning correlation
in order to assess changes in positional mobility. Lastly, I try to isolate the contribution
of educational expansion to changes in economic mobility using a decomposition approach,
that allows me to disentangle two factors : changes in the association between family
income and child’s human capital, on the one hand, and changes in the returns to human
capital, on the other hand.
This paper relates to a series of recent papers that have looked at changes over time in
the IGE in various countries. The most extensively studied country is by far the United
States. Several studies have estimated trends in the IGE using the Panel Study of In-
2come Dynamics (PSID) data and reached mixed conclusions. Early PSID studies include
in particular Fertig (2003) and Mayer & Lopoo (2005) and conclude to a recent rise in
intergenerational mobility. One of the limitations of these studies, as shown in subsequent
work (Hertz 2007, Lee & Solon 2009) is that life-cycle bias leads to underestimate the IGE
for the most recent and youngest cohort. A further limitation of studies based on PSID
data is that they cover a relatively limited interval of cohorts and a small sample. The
current conclusion that arises from the PSID data is that between the late 1970s and the
early 2000s, the IGE has remained roughly constant for males. The longer-run perspec-
tive adopted in Aaronson & Mazumder (2008) is probably closer to the perspective of the
present paper. They estimate changes in the IGE between 1940 and 2000, using census
data and relying, as I do here, on a two-sample instrumental variables approach. Their
conclusion is that the IGE exhibits a large fall between 1950 and 1980 and a sharp rise in
the recent period.
The assessment of trends in economic mobility has attracted researchers’ attention in
several other countries, including Britain - where non consensus has been reached on trends
at work (Ermisch & Francesconi 2004, Blanden, Goodman, Gregg & Machin 2004, Nicoletti
& Ermisch 2008, Erikson & Goldthorpe 2010)-, Finland (Pekkala & Lucas 2007), Italy
(Piraino 2007), Norway (Bratberg, Nilsen & Vaage 2003) and Sweden (Björklund, Jäntti
& Lindquist 2009).
With respect to the existing literature on trends in the IGE, the contribution present
paper is twofold. First, I analyze of a country that has not been studied so far, over a
relatively long time period. Second, I am able to provide a more detailed account of the
sources of change in the IGE than what is usually oﬀered in existing papers, using an
original decomposition.
Four main results emerge from this paper. First, taking into account life-cycle biases
and using an estimation procedure comparable to state-of-the-art estimates reveals that
the average IGE in France is around .5, a value higher than what was originally found in
Lefranc & Trannoy (2005). Second the IGE has fallen from a high of value of .6 for cohorts
born in the 1930s to around .45 for those born in the 1950s, but has subsequently risen
to a level close to the beginning of the period. Third, the initial fall in the IGE results
3from the joint eﬀect of a more equal labor market and a more opened educational system.
Fourth, the recent rise in the IGE partly reﬂects a rise in the association between parental
income and child’s education. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I ﬁrst discuss
the estimation procedure and the data used in the analysis (section 2). Then I present
the results of the ﬁrst-step estimation (section 3) and analyze the main trends in the IGE
across cohorts (section 4). Finally, I examine long-term changes in earnings inequality and
its contribution to changes in the IGE in section 5 and examine the role the educational
expansion in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Estimation method and data
2.1 Estimation method
Most of the economic analysis of intergenerational mobility focuses on estimating the IGE
in permanent (or long-term) earnings. This elasticity is given by the coeﬃcient  in the
following intergenerational earnings regression model :
Yi = 0 + Xi + i (1)
where Yi denotes the log of individual i’s long-term earnings and Xi denotes his father’s
long-term earnings. As already discussed in the literature,  should not be seen as a struc-
tural parameter measuring the causal eﬀect of parental resources on child’s earnings, but
rather as a "catch-all" descriptive measure of the intergenerational association in earnings,
capturing all possible channels of transmission.
To assess trends in the IGE, one can rely on the following extension of the intergener-
ational regression model, that allows for cohort heterogeneity in the parameters :
Yic = 0c + cXic + ic (2)
where c is an index of the birth cohort of the children and c is the IGE for cohort c.
The main objective of this paper is to assess changes in c for the widest possible range of
cohorts.
4The direct estimation of equation 2 for a large interval of cohorts requires a considerable
wealth of information. In fact, not only does it call for a linked data set in which both
father and child’s earnings are observed, but for each generation one needs to observe a
time-series of individual earnings in order to measure long-term earnings. Very few data
sets satisfy this data requisite although there are some exception like the PSID. But even
this fairly rich and long panel dataset fails to cover a wide range of children’s cohorts. In
France, there exists no linked father-child data set that conveys information on long-term
earnings.
In this paper, I estimate the cs using a two-sample instrumental variables (TSIV)
approach as originally derived in Arellano & Meghir (1992) and Angrist & Krueger (1995).
This method was ﬁrst applied to the estimation of the IGE by Björklund & Jäntti (1997).
The basic principle behind TSIV estimation is to replace Xic in equation 2 by a prediction
^ Xic formed on the basis of some observable father’s characteristics, Zic. Here, I use father’s
education to predict father’s earnings. In the rest of this section, I discuss the properties
of TSIV estimation and present the details of the speciﬁcation used in the paper.
The data requirements for TSIV estimation are signiﬁcantly less stringent than for the
direct estimation. The prediction is derived from a ﬁrst-step equation which is estimated
on a sample that is representative of the fathers’ population, and in which one observes
both earnings and the characteristics Zic. Given the estimation of the ﬁrst-step, the data
requirement for the estimation of c is to observe both child’s income and father’s charac-
teristics.
TSIV has been extensively used for the estimation of the IGE and its properties
are discussed in several papers including Solon (1999) and Nicoletti & Ermisch (2008).
These properties depend on the choice of the instrument. If the instrument only af-
fects child’s earnings through its eﬀect on father’s earnings, TSIV estimates of the cs
are consistent. In this case, indeed, TSIV estimation oﬀers the signiﬁcant advantage of
over-riding the attenuation bias that typically arises, because of classical measurement er-
rors, when estimating equation 2 with long-term earnings replaced by current earnings
(Solon 1992, Zimmerman 1992, Mazumder 2001)). However, if the instrument has a direct
eﬀect on the child’s outcome, than the TSIV estimate is biased and the direction of the bias
5depends on the sign of the direct eﬀect. When using father’s education as an instrument,
the expectation is that the direct eﬀect will be positive, hence resulting in an overestima-
tion of the IGE. However, in practice, the order of magnitude of this overestimation turns
out to be small, as discussed in Björklund & Jäntti (1997).
Another important source of bias in the estimation of the IGE is what has been recently
referred to as the life-cycle bias (Jenkins 1987, Grawe 2006, Haider & Solon 2006). This
bias arises when using current (usually annual) earnings instead of permanent earnings in
the estimation of the IGE. In the presence of individual heterogeneity in earnings growth
over the life-cycle, current earnings measures permanent earnings with error. Furthermore,
it can be shown that the error is not of the classical type and is correlated with both
true permanent earnings and individual age.1 As a result, diﬀerences in current earnings
across individuals will in general provide a biased estimate of permanent income diﬀeren-
tials. Since age-earnings proﬁles are steeper for high income individuals, current income
diﬀerentials, measured at an early stage of the life-cycle, will underestimate permanent in-
come diﬀerentials. Conversely, current income at the end of the life-cycle will over-estimate
permanent income diﬀerentials.
This form of measurement error will introduce an asymmetric bias in the estimation of
, depending on whether child or father’s earnings are aﬀected by this bias. Using current
earnings early (resp. late) in the life-cycle, as a proxy for child’s permanent earnings
will lead to underestimate (resp. overestimate) . Conversely, using current earnings
early (resp. late) in the life-cycle, as a proxy for father’s permanent earnings will lead to
overestimate (resp. underestimate) the IGE.
Accounting for life-cycle biases is of paramount importance when assessing trends over
time in the IGE. Mechanically, younger cohorts will be observed at an earlier stage of their
life-cycle then older cohorts, resulting in a lower IGE. In this case, inadequate treatment
of life-cycle bias will induce a spurious downward trend across cohorts in the value of the
IGE (Hertz 2007, Lee & Solon 2009, Nicoletti & Ermisch 2008).2 To account for this bias,
1The classical measurement error case refer to the situation where measurement error is independent of
the true value
2As a result, the use of diﬀerent sample selection criteria for fathers’ and children’s ages across studies
of intergenerational mobility jeopardizes the comparability of IGE estimates across countries, as discussed
in Grawe (2006).
6my speciﬁcation follows the one of Hertz and Lee & Solon and allows the IGE to vary with
child’s age by introducing an interaction term between child’s age and father’s predicted
earnings. By focusing on the main eﬀect of father’s earnings one can wipe out the eﬀect
of child’s age on the cross-cohort comparison. The reference age for children used in the
estimation of the IGE is the age of 40, as suggested by the rule of thumb of Haider &
Solon (2006). Similarly, for all cohorts I predict father’s earnings at the age of 40, hence
eliminating life-cycle bias on the dependant variable side as well.
In the end, I use the following speciﬁcation for the second-step equation :
Yict = t + c ^ Xic + g(ageict)  ^ Xic + fC(ageict) + eict (3)
where i and t are indices for individual and time. c denotes the ﬁve-year birth cohort
of individual i. The ts denote time dummies and f and g are fourth order polynomial
functions in individual age. I allow the age proﬁle to vary with year of birth and consider
four "super cohorts" indexed by C. The birth cohorts of these four groups are the following
: 1933-1942, 1943-1949, 1950-1959, 1960-1973.3 ^ Xic is predicted father’s earnings at age
40; the variable age is normalized to zero at age 40. Consequently c denotes the IGE for
cohort c if, as suggested in Haider & Solon (2006) the life-cycle bias is zero at age 40.
Let us now turn to the speciﬁcation of the ﬁrst-step equation. Its purpose is to predict
father’s income at the age of 40. The prediction is based on information on father’s educa-
tion. One of the diﬃculties is that for some of the children cohorts, in particular the oldest
ones, the relevant fathers cohorts are observed fairly late in their work career. For these
cohorts, earnings diﬀerentials in mid-career has to be predicted on the basis of end of career
wage diﬀerentials by education group. Hence, one needs to take away the wage growth that
occurred in between. Furthermore, for the prediction of wage diﬀerentials by education to
be consistent, one needs to account for heterogeneity in wage growth by education. This
is done by estimating parametric, yet ﬂexible, education-speciﬁc age-earnings proﬁles.
3The cutoﬀ years are chosen to balance group size. Since I am using multiple year cohorts, cohort dum-
mies could in principle be added to this speciﬁcation. Cohort dummies however turn out to be insigniﬁcant
when added to this speciﬁcation and their inclusion does not aﬀect the results.
7Formally, the second-step model I estimate is the following :
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Data sets and sample selection The data are taken from the ﬁrst ﬁve waves of the FQP
(Formation, Qualiﬁcation, Profession, i.e. Education, Training and Occupation) surveys
conducted by INSEE in 1964, 1970, 1977, 1985, 1993 and 2003. A new sample is drawn for
each wave, so the data do not have a panel structure. The number of individuals surveyed
varies across waves : 25 000 individuals in 1964, 38 000 from 1970 to 1985 and in 2003,
and 19 000 in 1993. For all waves but 1993 and 2003, individuals surveyed are taken
from a stratiﬁed sample of the French population of working age, with diﬀerent sampling
probabilities for each stratus. The FQP surveys focus on the description of individual labor
market outcomes, education as well. As discussed below, it also includes information on
several parental characteristics that may be used in TSIV estimation.
In the analysis, I use two distinct samples. The main sample is the sample of children, on
which the second-step equation (equation 3) is estimated. For this sample, I use waves 1970
to 2003 of the survey. In each wave, the sample is restricted to male heads of household,
born between 1931 and 1975 and aged 28 to 50 years old at the date of the survey. Since
income is not reported for these categories, I exclude self-employed children as well as
children whose father was self-employed from the sample. However, I test for the sensitivity
of the results to this exclusion.
The second sample used in the analysis is the sample of “pseudo-fathers” on which the
4In variants of this model, I also allowed for cohort heterogeneity in the function f, without any signif-
icant impact on the results.
8ﬁrst-step equation (equation 4) is estimated. This sample should be representative of the
population of the fathers of the individual sampled in our children sample. For this sample,
I use all waves of the survey, from 1964 to 2003, and restrict the sample to male heads of
household, aged 25 to 60 years old as of the survey date, who report at least one child, and
are not self-employed.
As previously discussed,the equations estimated on both samples allow for heterogeneity
by cohort in the eﬀect of the explanatory variables. For the estimation of the ﬁrst-step
equation, I use three-year cohorts to warrant large enough groups in each cohorts.5 For
the estimation of the second-step equation, where the sample relies on a smaller number of
survey waves, I use ﬁve-year cohorts.
The matching of individuals from the children and the pseudo-fathers samples is based
on the father’s characteristics used in the prediction of father’s earnings (as discussed
below), as well as on reports, provided in the children sample, of the year of birth of the
father. Given the age restriction imposed in the children and pseudo-fathers samples, the
oldest children cohort observed in the sample was born in 1931 and the oldest cohort of
pseudo-fathers from which to predict fathers’ earnings was born in 1904. This 27 years
gap is reasonable given that the mean age of the fathers at the birth of their children was
slightly above 30 in 1933.6 For children whose father was born before 1904, we assign the
predicted father’s wage of the cohort born in 1904. When information on father’s birth
year is missing the prediction of father’s earnings is based on the distribution of birth age
computed from non-missing observations.
Main variables For all individuals surveyed, the data contain detailed information on
education, as well as training, labor market experience, 4-digits occupation and industry
when relevant. Individual annual earnings (excluding unemployment beneﬁts) in the pre-
vious year and number of months worked full- and part-time are also collected in all waves
except 1964. In 1964, annual earnings are recorded in interval form, using 9 intervals.
Hence, all estimations results reported for wave 1964 are based on interval regression. In
all waves earnings refer to labor earnings and are only recorded for salaried workers.
5I group the ﬁrst two cohorts, 1903-1905 and 1906-1908.
6Daguet (2002).
9All surveys provide information about the respondent’s current family (marital status,
number of children) and family of origin (number of siblings, respondent’s birth rank).
Waves 1977 through 2003 also contain a detailed description of the educational attainment
and 2-digits occupation of the father of the respondent, and information about the geo-
graphical location of the respondent’s parents. This information is reported a posteriori by
survey respondents and refer to the time when the respondent left the schooling system.
While other characteristics of the father are available in the data set, in particular
occupation, only education is used in the ﬁrst step to predict father’s earnings. The reason
for this is the lack of synchronicity between the father’s age at which father’s occupation is
reported by the child and the age at which occupation is observed in the fathers’ sample.
On the one hand, children are asked to report the occupation of their father at the time they
ﬁnished school. On the other hand, the various father’s cohorts are observed at diﬀerent
points of their work career. For instance the oldest cohorts are typically observed in their
ﬁfties. Hence, using child’s report of occupation would be misleading as it would amount
to assume that occupation stayed constant between the middle and the end of the career.
The same problem could arise for other time-varying characteristics such as industry. On
the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that father’s education stayed constant over the
work career.
In all waves, education is recorded using a 10 levels education classiﬁcation that dis-
tinguishes between general and vocational education but the categories changed several
time over the ﬁve waves. I recoded education using a consistent classiﬁcation across survey
waves. The classiﬁcation is based on the highest degree achieved by the individual and dis-
tinguishes between six diﬀerent categories that reﬂect key stages in the French educational
system. The ﬁrst one gathers individuals with no degree. The second one corresponds to
individuals who passed the certiﬁcation exam organized at the end of primary education
(certiﬁcat d’études primaires.) This was the major degree taken in older cohorts, among
children of the lower and middle class.7 Next, we consider intermediate secondary ed-
ucation degrees, for the general and vocational tracks. The last two groups considered
are individuals who hold un upper secondary degree (baccalauréat) or a higher education
7Starting in 1972, the certiﬁcat d’études primaires was only taken by adults, in the context of adult
education programs. It was abandoned in 1989.
10degree.
The main summary statistics are given in table 1. We now turn to the discussion of the
results of the estimation of the ﬁrst-step equation and the analysis of trends in the earnings
structure and the distribution of education.
3 First-step estimates and trends in educational attainment
and returns to education
Before presenting the results of the ﬁrst-step equation, it is useful to brieﬂy document
the main historical trends in educational enrollment in France over the twentieth century.
These trends are described in ﬁgure 1. The major evolution is the large rise in access to
secondary and higher education. Among cohorts born at the beginning of the century, a
very large share of about 70% of the population exhibits a very low level of education,
with at most a primary education degree. At this period, mass-education is conﬁned to
primary schools. Secondary education is to a large extent a privilege of the upper class.
The degree of tracking is extremely high at this time. At the level of primary education, two
tracks co-exist. The ﬁrst one oﬀers regular primary education, as well as the possibility of
two extra-years of advanced primary training (classes primaires supérieures). The second
track is integrated into high-schools (lycées), that at the time concurrently oﬀer primary
education from the age of six. The two tracks are entirely disconnected and only the
children who attended the second one are oﬀered the chance to reach secondary education
degrees.
The opening up of access to secondary education takes place gradually after 1930 and
leads to a steady rise in the share of individuals with lower and upper secondary degrees.
This results from several policy reforms occurring between 1936 and 1975, but also reﬂects
the development of schooling infrastructure to accommodate the rise in number of pupils.
Among the key stages of educational reform in France in the twentieth century, one should
mention the extension of compulsory education from 13 to 14 (Zay, 1936)8 then 16 years
old (Berthoin, 1959) and two key reforms undertaken to abolish the strong tracking at work
8The name is the name of minister of education responsible for the reform mentioned, the date is the
date when the reform was enacted.
11in secondary education (Fouquet,1966; Haby, 1977). The rise in access to higher education
starts in the 1950s, for cohorts born in before WWII. It develops throughout the 1960s
among the baby-boom cohorts. Lastly it peaks up for cohorts born in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. This rises reﬂects the policies undertaken in the late 1980s and throughout
the 1990s to foster the development of higher education in France.9 Lastly, it is worth
emphasizing that while trends are somewhat similar to other developed countries, educa-
tional attainment in France is, throughout the period, markedly lower than in comparable
industrialized countries. For instance, at the end of the period, only about 35% of the
population obtain a higher education degree and 20% reach the level of upper secondary
education.
Let us now turn to the analysis of earnings diﬀerentials by level of education. The
analysis is based on the estimation of equation 4. Recall that this equation allows for
heterogeneity by cohort in the eﬀect of education and heterogeneity by education-groups
in age-earnings proﬁles. The detailed estimation results are provided in the appendix table
4 and summarized in ﬁgures 2 and 4.
Figure 2 presents the evolution over time of the earnings structure, by level of education.
The earnings premia attached to each of the six levels of education correspond to the
coeﬃcients cs in equation 4. These premia are expressed in deviation from the mean
income in each cohort and are predicted at age 40, using estimated age-earnings proﬁles.
The major result that emerges from the ﬁgure is that France experiences a marked decline
in the returns to education over the twentieth century. The largest fall occurs between
cohorts born at the beginning of the century and early baby-boomers born around 1940.
Whether this compression of education earnings premia led to a reduction of the overall
degree of earnings inequality cannot be deducted directly from ﬁgure 2. This is because the
evolutions of earnings dispersion also depends on changes in the distribution of education
in the population over time. In fact, at the beginning of the century, a very small share
of the total population was earning the high wage premia attached to tertiary and upper
secondary degrees, as already discussed. I now directly examine trends in earnings inequal-
ity over time, as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient. With our data, the major diﬃculty
9See Gurgand & Maurin (2007) for a related analysis of educational expansion in France.
12arising in assessing the evolution of earnings inequality across cohorts, is that cohorts are
observed at diﬀerent points of their life-cycle. To account for that I subtract education
and cohort-speciﬁc age-eﬀects to predict mid-career wages for each cohort and compare
earnings inequality by cohort.
Results are displayed in ﬁgure 3. The ﬁgure gives within-cohort Gini coeﬃcients for
annual earnings computed at age 40. Three main ﬁndings emerge from this ﬁgure. First,
cohorts born in the 1920s and the 1930s experienced a high degree of wage inequality.
Second, wage inequality fell markedly in the post WWII period throughout between the
1940 and the 1955 birth cohorts. Lastly, the within-cohort level of wage inequality stayed
approximately constant across cohorts born after 1955.
These results on long-term trends in earnings inequality are consistent with results
derived from alternative data sources and methodologies. Selz & Thélot (2004) estimate
standard Mincer equations for the period 1964 to 1998 and show that the returns to edu-
cation has fallen over time in France. Based on ﬁscal data, the results reported by Piketty
indicate a signiﬁcant fall, throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, in the ratio between the
average wage of higher-grade professionals and the average wage of manual workers in the
manufacturing sector (Piketty (2001), ﬁgure 3-7). Piketty (2003) also reports that the
1930s, 1950s and the 1960s where periods of historically high earnings inequality.
Two main factors lie behind the fall in earnings inequality displayed in ﬁgure 3. The
ﬁrst one is the massive wage compression that occurred at the end of the 1960 (in particular
in 1968, after the 1/3 rise in the minimum wage) and in the early 1970’s. The second one
is the competitive wage adjustment that followed the rise in the supply of highly educated
workers, as discussed in Goux & Maurin (2000).
Lastly, ﬁgure 4 presents age-earnings proﬁles by level of education, estimated in equa-
tion 4. Following Murphy & Welch (1990), age proﬁle is captured by a fourth-degree
polynomial. The results are consistent with evidence reported elsewhere of a fanning out
of wage proﬁles level of education.10 In particular, the age-earnings proﬁles of workers
with degrees equal to lower secondary vocational degrees or lower are fairly similar among
themselves but also ﬂatter than the age proﬁles of individuals with other secondary degrees
10See for instance Lillard (1977) for early evidence.
13(upper secondary or lower secondary general degree). The steepest proﬁle corresponds, as
expected, to individuals with higher education.
To summarize, the extent of wage and educational inequality has varied considerably
across cohorts over the last century. We now investigate how much of this inequality
has been transmitted across generations and the extent to which this intergenerational
transmission has varied over time.
4 Changes in the intergenerational earnings elasticity
4.1 Main results
Table 2 reports estimates of the IGE for various speciﬁcations of the intergenerational
regression model. The ﬁrst coeﬃcient in column 1 is the average IGE across all cohorts
included in the analysis. Over the full sample, the average intergenerational elasticity
amounts to .53. This value is consistent with the estimate of .4 reported in Lefranc &
Trannoy (2005). The fact that this latter estimate is based on a younger sample of children
and does not correct for life-cycle bias may account for the discrepancy. As shown below, the
rest of the gap may also be explained by the inclusion of both older and younger children
cohorts, for which the IGE is higher. In any case, this value of the IGE appears high
compared to estimates obtained for other developed countries and surveyed for instance in
Björklund & Jäntti (2009). IGEs of comparable magnitude are only found in low mobility
countries such as the United States (Mazumder 2005), Italy (Mocetti 2007), and the United
Kingdom (Dearden, Machin & Reed 1997). This conﬁrms that a large fraction of inequality
is transmitted across generations in France.
Column 2 of table 2 and ﬁgure 5 show our main estimates of the IGE for each of the
nine ﬁve-year cohorts. The evolution of the IGE exhibits a V-shaped pattern over the
period. The degree of intergenerational transmission decreases across cohorts until cohorts
born in the late 1950s but rises at the end of the period. Furthermore, as summarized in
ﬁgure 6, the IGE is signiﬁcantly higher for the early and late cohorts than for the middle
ones.
The value estimated for the two cohorts born in the 1930s is around .6, which is very
14high, compared to values reported elsewhere. By comparison, Aaronson & Mazumder
(2008) report a value of the IGE around .35 for US cohorts born in the same decade
and Pekkala & Lucas (2007) report a similar ﬁgure for Finland. Two factors are likely to
account for this relatively low degree of economic mobility among the oldest cohorts. First,
historical sociological evidence indicates that the degree of educational mobility was very
low in France at the beginning of the twentieth century (Thélot & Vallet 2000). Second,
these cohorts also experienced the high degree of labor market inequality at work in France
in the 1950s and the 1960s.
The decline in the IGE occurs for the ﬁrst part of the baby-boom cohorts, i.e. individ-
uals born in the second half of the 1940s and in the 1950s. In these three cohorts, the IGE
reaches a low value of .45, which is still relatively high by international standards. The
IGE subsequently rises for cohorts born in the 1960s and in the early 1970s to reach .55.
In the rest of the paper, we investigate the determinants of this rise and fall of economic
mobility in France, after performing some sensitivity analysis.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
As suggested by Hertz (2007) and Lee & Solon (2009), it is important to examine the role
played life-cycle eﬀects in the estimated mobility trends. To this end, ﬁgure 7 compares the
main estimates discussed in the previous section with the results one would obtain without
controlling for life-cycle biases. Omitting the interaction between father’s earnings and age
leads on average to underestimate the IGE . Three main points need to be emphasized.
First, for all cohorts, the bias is negative. The ﬁnding of a negative bias, despite having
imposed an age restriction centered on the mid-career (28-50 years old) can be easily
explained by the concavity of the interaction eﬀect, as shown in ﬁgure 8. Second, the bias
is for most cohorts relatively small and at most equal to -.05, with the notable exception
of the last cohort. For individuals born in the early 1970s, who are surveyed earlier in
their life-cycle, the bias is more important and close to -.1. Third, the V-shaped trend in
the intergenerational persistence of inequality is largely present even without controlling
for life-cycle eﬀects. Including the interaction term between child’s age and father’s wage
simply slightly reinforces the estimated upward trend in the IGE in the most recent period.
15The second robustness check I perform amounts to assess to the inﬂuence of excluding
self-employed workers. Since labor income is not reported by self-employed workers, I
excluded from my samples both self-employed children and the children of self-employed
fathers. The latter category represents about 30% of the children’s sample while the former
one amounts to 13%. There is no way to satisfactorily predict the incidence of excluding
self-employed workers from the analysis. To explore this question, I simulated father’s
earnings for the children of self-employed workers on the basis of the Mincer equation
estimated for salaried fathers. This allows me to include the children of self-employed
fathers in the estimation, as long as they are themselves salaried.11 Results are given in
table 2, column 4 and in ﬁgure 9. The level and time trends are very similar to those
previously discussed. Of course, the validity of this robustness check hinges upon stringent
restrictions. It requires that the relationship between schooling and earnings is similar for
salaried and self-employed workers. Or at least that the bias induced by the use of a Mincer
equation estimated on the sole sample of salaried workers stays constant over time. Both
hypothesis are of course open to discussion. One additional point to keep in mind is that
a large fraction of self-employed, especially at the beginning of the period, were farmers.
As is well-known, earnings in agriculture tend to be relatively low(e.g. Lefranc, Pistolesi
& Trannoy 2009) and occupational inheritance is particularly strong among farmers. This
may that the IGE is underestimated, in particular in the early period. However, at the
very least, ﬁgure 9 indicates that the relationship between father’s education and child’s
wage is very similar for the children of self-employed and salaried fathers and suggests that
the trends in ﬁgure 5 may capture a general pattern of changes in economic mobility in the
French society.
5 Changes in earnings inequality and the intergenerational
correlation coeﬃcient
Changes in economic mobility, as captured by the intergenerational earnings elasticity, are
of course deeply connected to the evolution of earnings inequality in society. Since the IGE
11In my sample, this is the case for 75% of the children of self-employed fathers.
16is a regression coeﬃcient its value is sensitive to the variance of both fathers’ and children’s
earnings. In particular, for a given distribution of parental characteristics, any reduction
in earnings inequality among children, would “mechanically” lead to a fall in the IGE.
This should by no means suggest that the IGE provides an inadequate measure of
economic mobility. In fact, if some policy change brings more equality in the children’s
generation, for a given degree of inequality among parents, the intergenerational transmis-
sion of inequality unambiguously decreases and most people would probably agree that
intergenerational mobility has increased. One should however note that a reduction in
earnings inequality in the children’s generation leaves unaﬀected the chances that a child
from a disadvantaged background succeeds better than a child from a more privileged one,
or vice versa. This speciﬁc form of mobility is usually referred to as positional mobility.12
It corresponds to the sociological notion of relative (as opposed to absolute) mobility.
Positional mobility can be measured by the intergenerational correlation coeﬃcient
(IGC), . This coeﬃcient is given by the usual formula and is by construction unaﬀected
by changes in the variance of earnings in the children’s or father’s generation. The link





In the steady state, the variance of earnings is constant across generations and the IGE
and IGC are identical. This is no longer the case whenever Y and X diﬀer. Furthermore,
this formula makes clear that changes in the IGE will reﬂect both changes in positional
mobility and the evolution across generations of earnings inequality. I now examine the
historical evolution of these two components.
The main challenge for assessing trends in the ratio Y
X is that, as already discussed,
I do not observe permanent earnings for children and fathers. For children, I observe
current earnings. Furthermore, the point in individual life-cycles where current earnings
are observed varies across cohorts. This problem is addressed by removing age eﬀects
around age 40. Removing life-cycle eﬀects, however, does not eliminate transitory earnings
12For a recent discussion of the deﬁnition and measurement of mobility, see for instance Cowell &
Flachaire (2011).
17components. As a consequence, Y will be overestimated. On the contrary, for fathers, my
earnings measure is predicted on the basis of observable characteristics. Since this leaves
out unobserved permanent characteristics, X will be underestimated. However, if the
proportional bias in the estimation of Y and X stays constant over time, the estimation
of the trends in Y
X will be consistent, although the estimation of the level will be biased.13
Of course, given an estimate of Y
X, equation 5 implies that the IGC can be estimated by
the product of the ratio Y
X with our estimated of the IGE. Again, only the trends in the
IGC are likely to be consistently estimated.
Trends in the IGC and in the father-son ratio of log-earnings standard-deviations are
given in ﬁgure 10. Until the late 1950s, the evolution of the ratio X
Y is broadly similar to
the trends in the IGE. It is relatively stable over the 1930s and the ﬁrst half of the 1940s.
It strongly rises between the second half of the 1940s and the 1950s, under the impulse of
the fall of earnings inequality in the children’s generation, already noted in ﬁgure 3. After
that date, it slowly decreases since, with a lag, earnings inequality starts declining among
parents. The IGC on the contrary follows a diﬀerent evolution. It is roughly stable and if
anything slowly declining over cohorts born in the 1930s and 1940s. It rises in the 1950s
to reach a level slightly above the starting value. It keeps mildly increasing over the latest
cohorts.
Several conclusions emerge from these discrepant trends. The ﬁrst one is that the large
fall in the IGE occurring between cohorts born in the early 1930s and those born in the
late 1950s is largely driven by the fall in cross-section earnings inequality among children.
In other words, children born after World War II (WWII) inherit a smaller share of their
parents’ economic advantage because society has become more equal. Not because the
degree of positional mobility in the French society has increased. Second, the later rise in
the IGE is, to some extent, the delayed eﬀect of this fall in cross-section inequality. With
time, the ratio X
Y decreases and the IGE converges back to its steady-state value, which
depends on the degree of positional mobility, i.e. the IGC. Lastly, the recent evolution is
made even worse by the slow rise in the IGC, which suggests declining positional mobility.
13The results reported in Moﬃtt & Gottschalk (1995) are supportive of this assumption. This assumption
is implicit in Aaronson & Mazumder (2008)
186 The contribution of educational expansion
Educational policy is often seen as the means par excellence of equalizing life-chances
and fostering social mobility. On the opposite side, educational investment is also often
considered as one of the main channels of the intergenerational transmission of ability. In
this perspective, the rise in access to upper secondary and higher education that occurred
after World War II may have contributed to the evolution of intergenerational mobility. I
investigate this contribution in this section.
The contribution of education acquisition to the intergenerational earnings elasticity
can be summarized by the following system of equations :
Hic = cXic + uic (6)
Yic = 1
cHic + 2
cXic + eic (7)
where H denotes the human capital of the child. Equation 6 captures the relationship
between parental income and human capital accumulation, as discussed for instance in
Becker & Tomes (1979) and Solon (2004). In equation 7, child’s earnings are determined
by child’s human capital and, residually, parental earnings. Using this system, the IGE




As this equation makes clear, the intergenerational earnings elasticity is a function of three
key parameters : the eﬀect of parental income on the human capital of the child (1
c),
the returns to human capital (c) and the residual eﬀect of parental earnings on child’s
earnings, conditional on human capital (2
c).
To implement this decomposition, I ﬁrst estimate equation 7 by regressing child’s income
on child’s number of years of education and predicted father’s income. As for the main
IGE estimates, the coeﬃcient on father’s income should not be interpreted in a causal
sense but as a catch-all measure of the residual impact of all family attributes related to
income, once educational attainment has been taken into account. The results are given
in column 2 of table 3 and in ﬁgure 11.14 Several results emerge from this estimation.
14The econometric model also allows for year and age eﬀects, as well as age  father’s earnings interac-
19First, similar to the results found for the US (Aaronson & Mazumder 2008) and Sweden
(Björklund et al. 2009), I ﬁnd that the residual eﬀect of father’s earnings 2
c accounts for
50 to 60% of the total IGE. In other terms, education acquisition accounts for at most
half of the intergenerational transmission of earnings inequality. Second, the time trend
followed by the residual elasticity is roughly similar to that of the base IGE : the IGE
falls for intermediate cohorts and rises again for the most recent ones. Interestingly, while
the overall IGE at the end of the period is lower than for cohorts born in the 1930s, it is
no longer the case for the residual elasticity. For cohorts born in the 1970s, the residual
transmission of earnings inequality is higher than for cohorts born in the 1930s.
The contribution of education acquisition to the intergenerational transmission of earn-
ings can be computed as the gap between the overall IGE, c and the residual elasticity 2
c.
This contribution is represented in ﬁgure 11. It falls almost continuously over the period,
from a high value of about .26 for cohorts born in the 1930s to a low value of about .16
for cohorts born in the 1970s. As emphasized by equation 8, this evolution results from
changes in two parameters : the semi-elasticity of human capital to parental income and
the earnings returns to human capital. The evolution of the latter component is given in
table 3, column 2. The returns to education fall over time from .055 to about .03. This fall
occurs in two steps, with a ﬁrst drop between the early 1930s and the early 1940s cohorts
and a second one for cohorts born in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These values of the
returns to education lay on the low end of estimates reported in other studies, probably
owing to the inclusion of father’s earnings as an additional regressor. However trends are
consistent with previous results (Selz & Thélot 2004).
This fall in the returns to education should induce, other things equal, a decrease in
the IGE. But the overall evolution of the contribution of education to the intergenerational
transmission of earnings also depends on the semi-elasticity  of years of schooling with
respect to father’s earnings. This semi-elasticity is reported in column 3, table 3 and in
ﬁgure 12. The statistical association between years of education and parental earnings falls
over time until cohorts born in the ﬁrst half of the 1960s but subsequently rises to reach
an even higher level than for the early 1930s cohorts.
tions. Table 3, column 1, re-estimates the main IGE model on the sub-sample with non-missing education
data.
20The secular rise in educational mobility that occurs until the very end of the period
is relatively well-known. It has also been consistently noted in several studies that have
focused on the association between parents’ and child’s education (e.g. Thélot & Vallet
2000). What is less well-known, however, is the reversal of the trend in the recent decades,
although the results reported here are conﬁrmed by those of Vallet & Selz (2007). This
decrease in educational mobility, occurring at the end of the period can be characterized
by a rise in the inﬂuence of family background on educational attainment. Of course, it
contributes to the rise in the intergenerational transmission of inequality as we now discuss.
As already noted the role played by educational attainment in the intergenerational
transmission of inequality is mediated by two factors : educational mobility, on the one
hand, the returns to education, on the other hand. Until cohorts born in the early 1960s,
both eﬀects go in the same direction, but diverge thereafter. To isolate the contribution of
the educational mobility parameter c to the intergenerational transmission of earnings, I
compute how the contribution of education to the IGE would have evolved if the earnings
returns to education had stayed constant. This is contribution is computed as 1c where
the two contributions, I plot in ﬁgure 11 the evolution of 1
c , i.e. the component of the
IGE arising through education that would have occurred if the returns to education had
stayed constant over time at their mean value  . Since it amounts to hold constant any
evolution that might have occurred on the labor market, this comes closer to measuring the
contribution of changes that have taken place in the educational system. This simulation
casts a diﬀerent light on the contribution of education to the intergenerational transmission
of inequality, as it indicates a fall in mobility, even beyond the initially low levels of the
1930s.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have estimated trends in intergenerational mobility in France for cohorts
of children born between the 1930s and the mid-1970s. The ﬁrst result arising from this
analysis pertains to the overall level of intergenerational mobility in France. Once life-cycle
eﬀects are taken into account, the intergenerational earnings elasticity in France amounts
to an average value of .53. This value is much higher (although consistent) with estimates
21previously reported for France and indicates a very low degree of mobility by international
standards. Second, I show that the intergenerational earnings elasticity followed a V-shaped
patterns across birth cohorts. From a high value of .6 for cohorts born in the 1930s, the
intergenerational elasticity falls to a low value of .45 for cohorts born in the late 1940s and
the 1950s. It subsequently rises to reach a value of .55 for cohorts born in the early 1970s.
The fall in the intergenerational transmission of earnings inequality experienced by
the cohorts born after World War II seems largely related to the decrease in earnings
inequality and the returns to education that occurred for the most part in the 1970s and
early 1980s. This reduction in inequality has brought closer together the earnings prospects
of individuals whose parents had faced very diﬀerent earnings levels. At the same time,
over this period, the degree of positional mobility, as captured by the intergenerational
earnings correlation has remained roughly unchanged.
In the end, this rise in intergenerational mobility turns out to be short-lived and limited
to the generational transition between two societies : the unequal society experienced by
pre-baby boom cohorts and the more equal one enjoyed by the baby-boomers. The early
baby-boomers appeared more mobile than their parents only because they enjoyed more
intra-generational equality. As the early baby-boomers became parents themselves, their
children also experienced this less unequal society. Yet, since positional mobility did not
improve, this led the intergenerational elasticity to fall back toward its initial level.
All in all, these results empirically demonstrates that the intergenerational elasticity is
very sensitive to inequality dynamics and that its evolution, outside the steady-state, could
provide a misleading characterization of the long-run evolution of intergenerational mobil-
ity. This contrasts with the greater stability of the intergenerational earnings correlation.
Whether intergenerational mobility in France will get back, in the near future, to the
low level experienced by the cohorts born in the 1930s is an open question. There are rea-
sons, however to be pessimistic. First, positional mobility seems to have slightly decreased.
Second, while intergenerational mobility initially beneﬁted from the large educational ex-
pansion of the post-WWII era, the association between parents’ earnings and child’s edu-
cational achievement has also risen recently. If earnings inequality was to rise among recent
cohorts, the degree to which economic inequality is transmitted across generations could
22well rise to unprecedented levels.
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1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
cohort
tertiary deg. higher secondary deg.
lower secondary gen. deg. lower secondary voc. deg.
primary deg. no deg.
Notes : The ﬁgure gives the distribution of highest degree obtained, by cohort for
three-year cohorts.





























1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
cohort
tertiary deg. higher secondary deg.
lower secondary gen. deg. lower secondary voc. deg.
primary deg. no deg.
Notes : The ﬁgure gives the log annual earnings diﬀerential between each educational
group and the mean annual earnings, for each three-years cohorts, based on the
estimates of equation 4, reported in table 4. Earnings diﬀerentials are predicted at
age 40.





























1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
cohort
Notes : to account for life-cycle eﬀects, age-eﬀects are subtracted in order so as to
predict earnings at age 40 for each cohort. This is done using an earnings equation
that allows for education- and cohort-speciﬁc age-eﬀects.
























−20 −10 0 10 20
age
tertiary deg. higher secondary deg.
lower secondary gen. deg. lower secondary voc. deg.
primary deg. no deg.
Notes : The ﬁgure gives the age-earnings proﬁle for each educational group based on
the estimates of equation 4, reported in table 4. The earnings variable on the y-axis
is the log of annual earnings.
28Table 2: Intergenerational earnings elasticity, by cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
all cohorts .530
(0.0104)
1931-1935 0.626 0.614 0.650
(0.0245) (0.0240) (0.0207)
1936-1940 0.593 0.565 0.605
(0.0184) (0.0169) (0.0155)
1941-1945 0.561 0.522 0.588
(0.0184) (0.0167) (0.0159)
1946-1950 0.459 0.411 0.473
(0.0185) (0.0161) (0.0164)
1951-1955 0.441 0.396 0.466
(0.0204) (0.0179) (0.0183)
1956-1960 0.441 0.403 0.442
(0.0223) (0.0202) (0.0201)
1961-1965 0.492 0.456 0.520
(0.0234) (0.0225) (0.0211)
1966-1970 0.543 0.503 0.542
(0.0289) (0.0280) (0.0267)
1971-1975 0.559 0.477 0.566
(0.0357) (0.0325) (0.0323)
father’s earnings(age-40) 0.00474 0.00414 0.00494
(0.00132) (0.00137) (0.00119)
father’s earnings(age-40)2 -0.000782 -0.000574 -0.000570
(0.000191) (0.000198) (0.000172)
Observations 21317 21317 21317 29489
Notes : Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log of annual
earnings. Reported estimates are based on equation 3. Columns 1-3 exclude self-
employed children and the children of self-employed fathers, as discussed in page 8.
Column 4 includes the children of self-employed fathers, whose earnings are predicted
on the basis of the ﬁrst-step equation estimated on non self-employed fathers. All
equations include year and age eﬀects.
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cohort
Notes : reported IGEs are based on the estimates in table 2, column 2.











































1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971
cohort
Notes : a square indicates that the IGE for the cohort on the horizontal axis is signif-
icantly higher than the IGE for the cohort on the vertical axis, at the 1% level; tests
are based on the estimates in table 2, column 2.
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cohort
w/ age*IGE interaction w/o age*IGE interaction
Notes : reported IGEs are based on the estimates in table 2, columns 2 and 3.
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Notes : age proﬁles are based on the estimates in table 2, columns 2

















1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
cohort
w/o children of self−employed w/ children of self−employed
Notes : reported IGEs are based on the estimates in table 2, columns 2 and 4.
















Notes : see details on page 17. The ratio
X
Y is computed using earnings net of age
eﬀects for children and predicted earnings for fathers. The estimated IGC is derived
from estimates of
X
Y and the IGE
33Table 3: Decomposition of the intergenerational earnings elasticity and analysis of the
contribution of education, by cohort
(1) (2) (3)
father’s earnings
 cohort 1931-1935 0.624 0.361 4.678
(0.0245) (0.0259) (0.195)
1936-1940 0.591 0.354 4.909
(0.0184) (0.0193) (0.146)
1941-1945 0.562 0.360 4.481
(0.0184) (0.0190) (0.146)
1946-1950 0.459 0.255 4.634
(0.0185) (0.0192) (0.147)
1951-1955 0.440 0.256 4.101
(0.0204) (0.0208) (0.162)
1956-1960 0.440 0.263 3.744
(0.0223) (0.0228) (0.178)
1961-1965 0.493 0.286 3.848
(0.0234) (0.0247) (0.186)
1966-1970 0.543 0.371 4.542
(0.0289) (0.0308) (0.230)
1971-1975 0.560 0.399 5.176
(0.0357) (0.0384) (0.284)
number of years of education


















Observations 21285 21285 21285
Notes : Standard errors in parentheses. Dependant variables : columns (1)














1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
cohort
total residual
education education w/ constant returns
Notes : total denotes the overall IGE; residual denotes the residual elasticity of child’s
earnings w.r.t. father’s earnings, conditional on child’s education; education denotes
the gap between total and residual and represents the component of the intergenera-
tional transmission that occurs through education acquisition; education w/ constant
returns assumes that the wage returns are constant. See page 19 for details.















1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
cohort
Notes : see table 3, column 3.
35A First-step estimation results
Table 4: First-step equation estimation- Dependant variable : log(annual earning
Coeﬃcient Standard-error
Intercept 11.07849 0.02317
Survey wave 1964 -2.02079 0.05239
Survey wave 1970 -1.54555 0.03763
Survey wave 1977 -0.77385 0.02083
Survey wave 1985 REF REF
Survey wave 1993 0.195 0.02162
Survey wave 2003 0.36777 0.0452
Higher education  cohort 1903-1908 0.81475 0.12866
cohort 1909-1911 1.16551 0.10197
cohort 1912-1914 1.10396 0.08439
cohort 1915-1917 1.08556 0.08202
cohort 1918-1920 1.06448 0.06438
cohort 1921-1923 1.15622 0.05626
cohort 1924-1926 1.1459 0.04904
cohort 1927-1929 1.13798 0.04263
cohort 1930-1932 1.06117 0.03787
cohort 1933-1935 1.02424 0.03331
cohort 1936-1938 0.97107 0.03055
cohort 1939-1941 0.9793 0.03024
cohort 1942-1944 0.93336 0.02902
cohort 1945-1947 0.88995 0.03228
cohort 1948-1950 0.83229 0.03663
cohort 1951-1953 0.79944 0.0432
cohort 1954-1956 0.82623 0.04941
cohort 1957-1959 0.85314 0.05731
cohort 1960-1962 0.81899 0.06513
cohort 1963-1965 0.78852 0.07122
cohort 1966-1968 0.76642 0.07735
cohort 1969-1971 0.68211 0.08634
cohort 1972-1974 0.79002 0.09634
cohort 1975-1977 0.89199 0.12369
Upper secondary education  cohort 1903-1908 0.81341 0.11635
cohort 1909-1911 0.71667 0.09527
cohort 1912-1914 0.66017 0.08053
cohort 1915-1917 0.71072 0.07883
cohort 1918-1920 0.65198 0.06351
cohort 1921-1923 0.72269 0.05454
continued on next page
36continued from previous page
Coeﬃcient Standard-error
cohort 1924-1926 0.75209 0.04972
cohort 1927-1929 0.72382 0.04221
cohort 1930-1932 0.67149 0.03715
cohort 1933-1935 0.63794 0.03384
cohort 1936-1938 0.63742 0.03057
cohort 1939-1941 0.60632 0.03114
cohort 1942-1944 0.65838 0.03028
cohort 1945-1947 0.63164 0.03356
cohort 1948-1950 0.56864 0.03854
cohort 1951-1953 0.53562 0.04506
cohort 1954-1956 0.51598 0.05174
cohort 1957-1959 0.5798 0.05963
cohort 1960-1962 0.50812 0.06751
cohort 1963-1965 0.40081 0.07498
cohort 1966-1968 0.50465 0.08356
cohort 1969-1971 0.50156 0.09001
cohort 1972-1974 0.52222 0.10059
cohort 1975-1977 0.52277 0.12804
Vocational lower secondary education  cohort 1903-1908 0.52683 0.10706
cohort 1909-1911 0.43077 0.08902
cohort 1912-1914 0.34072 0.07847
cohort 1915-1917 0.38576 0.07435
cohort 1918-1920 0.31771 0.06465
cohort 1921-1923 0.32774 0.0567
cohort 1924-1926 0.39001 0.04807
cohort 1927-1929 0.38538 0.04041
cohort 1930-1932 0.35044 0.03377
cohort 1933-1935 0.31888 0.02919
cohort 1936-1938 0.32502 0.02602
cohort 1939-1941 0.30817 0.02576
cohort 1942-1944 0.34435 0.02664
cohort 1945-1947 0.33661 0.0295
cohort 1948-1950 0.30067 0.03372
cohort 1951-1953 0.30649 0.03925
cohort 1954-1956 0.27512 0.04615
cohort 1957-1959 0.23128 0.05271
cohort 1960-1962 0.26338 0.06003
cohort 1963-1965 0.28808 0.06708
cohort 1966-1968 0.20279 0.07467
cohort 1969-1971 0.21897 0.08381
cohort 1972-1974 0.2218 0.0964
cohort 1975-1977 0.13839 0.11209
continued on next page
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Coeﬃcient Standard-error
General lower secondary education  cohort 1903-1908 0.48551 0.16436
cohort 1909-1911 0.51844 0.113
cohort 1912-1914 0.38922 0.09497
cohort 1915-1917 0.43514 0.09527
cohort 1918-1920 0.53869 0.06946
cohort 1921-1923 0.59943 0.05973
cohort 1924-1926 0.55672 0.05514
cohort 1927-1929 0.58391 0.04942
cohort 1930-1932 0.55715 0.04569
cohort 1933-1935 0.55848 0.04114
cohort 1936-1938 0.51152 0.03915
cohort 1939-1941 0.57927 0.03974
cohort 1942-1944 0.56049 0.03729
cohort 1945-1947 0.56478 0.03746
cohort 1948-1950 0.45991 0.04103
cohort 1951-1953 0.43696 0.04703
cohort 1954-1956 0.41605 0.05376
cohort 1957-1959 0.38419 0.05995
cohort 1960-1962 0.36589 0.06886
cohort 1963-1965 0.34144 0.07735
cohort 1966-1968 0.31887 0.09141
cohort 1969-1971 0.3862 0.1149
cohort 1972-1974 0.25528 0.12127
cohort 1975-1977 0.18722 0.14538
Primary education  cohort 1903-1908 0.17138 0.09765
cohort 1909-1911 0.08483 0.08412
cohort 1912-1914 0.12143 0.07472
cohort 1915-1917 0.04544 0.07036
cohort 1918-1920 0.13836 0.05796
cohort 1921-1923 0.16632 0.0505
cohort 1924-1926 0.1284 0.0437
cohort 1927-1929 0.1956 0.03771
cohort 1930-1932 0.17811 0.03275
cohort 1933-1935 0.17726 0.02868
cohort 1936-1938 0.19038 0.02618
cohort 1939-1941 0.18506 0.02556
cohort 1942-1944 0.20507 0.02746
cohort 1945-1947 0.21596 0.03033
cohort 1948-1950 0.1985 0.03508
cohort 1951-1953 0.17256 0.04162
cohort 1954-1956 0.13222 0.04978
continued on next page
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Coeﬃcient Standard-error
cohort 1957-1959 0.13845 0.06296
cohort 1960-1962 0.002561 0.09492
cohort 1963-1965 0.02179 0.12145
cohort 1966-1968 0.13773 0.12587
cohort 1969-1971 0.027 0.15483
cohort 1972-1974 REF REF
cohort 1975-1977 0.25003 0.27188
No degree  cohort 1903-1908 -0.30789 0.09562
cohort 1909-1911 -0.21478 0.082
cohort 1912-1914 -0.25026 0.07362
cohort 1915-1917 -0.1957 0.06831
cohort 1918-1920 -0.1328 0.05839
cohort 1921-1923 -0.13952 0.05116
cohort 1924-1926 -0.14278 0.04413
cohort 1927-1929 -0.05048 0.03753
cohort 1930-1932 -0.01186 0.03143
cohort 1933-1935 -0.0195 0.02644
cohort 1936-1938 -0.03573 0.02393
cohort 1942-1944 0.04328 0.02649
cohort 1945-1947 0.05283 0.03011
cohort 1948-1950 0.07432 0.03414
cohort 1951-1953 0.03682 0.04068
cohort 1954-1956 0.06587 0.04801
cohort 1957-1959 0.08896 0.05413
cohort 1960-1962 0.06238 0.06132
cohort 1963-1965 0.03734 0.0688
cohort 1966-1968 0.06437 0.0777
cohort 1969-1971 -0.02133 0.0863
cohort 1972-1974 0.0776 0.09626
cohort 1975-1977 -0.06945 0.11295








Vocational lower secondary education age 0.0096945 0.0027407
age2 -0.000448 0.000169
age3 0.00001352 7.71E-06
continued on next page
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Coeﬃcient Standard-error
age4 -1.03E-06 6.80E-07












 Normal 0.4423 0.0014413
Number of Observations 48245
Noncensored Values 41394
Log Likelihood -36966.33378
40